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use#LAAstory to a global one, why have there been so few episodes of civil violence
in American cities since the 1970s, especially in light of recent riots in Paris,
London, and elsewhere? Some of Katz’s answers are predictable to any
student of urban politics, such as that political reforms incorporated some
African-Americans into visible public positions without altering the funda-
mental bases of political power—for example, though the number of black
big-city mayors has increased, real power has shifted from cities to the state
and federal governments. Other answers are less familiar, including his nu-
anced discussion of the depoliticizing effect of consumer marketing in poor
urban areas and the militarization of urban spaces. Perhaps his most inter-
esting argument, although the least developed, is that the incorporation
and control of recent immigrants through structural means such as high
employment rates also reduces civic violence in U.S. cities.
Inthelastchapter,Katzturnstothepoliticalimplicationsofhowthestory
of America’s citieshas beentold.He arguesthat conservatives and progres-
sives embraced a similar narrative, describing the history of the American
city as a series of failures spearheaded by misguided or nefarious govern-
mentbureaucracies.Thisdrearypicturesidelinedthosegovernmentpolicies
and programs that sustained vital urban communities; it also ignored the
beneﬁcial effects of grassroots urban social movements, many built on vi-
brant multiethnic and multiracial political coalitions. And it positioned the
stateas a main culprit andprivatization as the implicit,favored alternative.
Urban poverty became a problem that only free-market forces could solve.
Suchadiscourse,Katzargues,underlaythehostofmarket-basedinitiatives
introduced in American cities in the past several decades, such as microﬁ-
nance and asset accumulation. Often based on neoliberal programs abroad,
these were meant to change individuals or small groups of people, not soci-
etymorebroadly.Theywereintroducedpreciselytofosterentrepreneurship
as a substitute for government aid or structural change.
Many audiences would beneﬁt from reading this book. Highly accessible
and well written, it could be used in upper-level undergraduateor graduate
classes on urban studies, race, public policy, and poverty. Katz’s work also
deserves attention from policy makers, political activists, and sociologists
interested in a cogent account of current debates in urban studies and the
social conditions of the modern city.
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Why have 180 countries around the world, including the tiny Paciﬁc island
nation of Nauru, with a population of 11,000, no ﬁnancialinstitutions, 90%
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850unemployment, anda national debt 16 times its GDP, adopted anti-money-
laundering policies? Why, when the world’s ﬁnancial elites suspect that
these policies are ineffective, and cost more in regulatory and compliance
effort than they save by preventing money laundering, would so many
countries jump on the bandwagon?
InTheMoneyLaundry,J.C.Sharmanbuildsonhisearlierbooksexplor-
ing tax havens, corruption, and the recycling of ill-gotten gains to examine
thespreadofanti-money-launderinglawsaroundtheworld.Hepushesfor-
ward the world polity agenda of John Meyer and associates, arguing that
money-laundering regulations spread to countries hoping to seem modern,
efﬁcient, and transparent. These regulations signal that a country doesn’t
put up with the sort of criminal ﬁnancial transactions thought to be com-
monplace in the backwaters. They are a sure way to show that the eras of
Noriega and Gadhaﬁ are over. But Sharman argues that countries do not
go down this pathway willingly. Financial professionals in the developed
world who have built careers engineering anti-money-laundering regula-
tions blacklist countries that don’t join the bandwagon and this brings
countries on board without fail.
This lively and engaging book is divided into two parts, the ﬁrst showing
that anti-money-laundering policies are ineffective, the second showing
why they diffuse. Sharman not only posits that the policy innovation he
studies is worthless, as world polity theorists are wont to do; he goes to con-
siderabletroubletoprovethatthesepoliciesmaybeharmful.Toexplorethe
efﬁcacy of anti-money-laundering regulations, Sharman uses two tech-
niques, one conventional, the other novel. The conventional method is to
review studies of the efﬁcacy of the regulation, interview key players in the
game, and attend closed-door meetings of regional groups overseeing na-
tionalanti-money-launderingprograms.Previousstudiesshowthatregula-
tions don’t work, experts don’t think they work, they impose signiﬁcant
costsonﬁnancialinstitutionsintheformofreportingrequirements,andvil-
lains can still launder money. Regional associations are not sanguine but
carry on, trying to promote higher standards.
The second technique for examining the efﬁcacy of anti-money-laundering
rules is ingenious, and involves a “direct test,” or audit, of the regulations in
countries around the world. Sharman solicited offers for anonymous shell
companies,withassociatedbankaccounts,whichprovidethemeanstolaun-
der money. Such offers break the ﬁrst rule of anti-money-laundering reg-
ulations: know your customer. This approach is akin to that reported by
Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn in Half the Sky, in which antislavery
laws are shown to be a sham through successful efforts to buy slaves. It
turns out to be easy to set up an anonymous shell corporation for the pur-
pose of laundering money. Academics will appreciate this chapter for its
method,andaspiringinternationalcriminalswillappreciateitasapractical
guide.
Sharman received responses to 102 requests to establish shell corpora-
tions and, in 41 cases, was not required to provide proof of identity. He
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851would be able to launder cash without being identiﬁed. Those 41 offers
were disproportionately in the United States and other OECD countries.
Most contacts in developing countries, and tax havens, required proof of
identity in conformity with anti-money-laundering laws. It appears that in
those nations, the risk of losing legitimacy either stimulates ofﬁcials to en-
force regulations or leads agents to heed them. The bottom line is that
shouldyouwanttolaundermoney,youhavealotofoptionsanddon’thave
to go to Bolivia.
We don’t really need to be convinced that anti-money-laundering reg-
ulations are ineffective to be interested in why they have spread to coun-
tries like Nauru, but knowing that they don’t work certainly makes
that question more interesting. Not only is it easy to set up the appara-
tus to launder money, but the developed world that built the standards
doesn’t abide by them. Why do countries use scarce resources on such reg-
ulations, creating regulatory bureaucracies and making legitimate ﬁrms
document compliance? The world polity camp suggests that developing
countries copy developed countries in order to gain access to global ﬁ-
nancial markets, and gain legitimacy beyond their borders. They would
be partly right, but in this case, developing nations were coerced. Once
the developed world put anti-money-laundering regulations into place,
led in the 1990s by the Financial Action Task Force, professionals cre-
ated a blacklist to get developing countries to join. In the process, they
expanded their scope of professional inﬂuence, and of course, got to
travel to Barbados and Guyana to help craft laws and build compliance
systems.
The second half of the book, exploring why developing countries adopt
anti-money-laundering regulations, offers a primer on the role of power in
the world polity. Sharman argues that money laundering experts used the
threat of exclusion from global ﬁnancial markets to convince governments
inthedevelopingworldtoadoptregulations.Heshowsthatwhilecountries
hoped to achieve legitimacy and status in the global ﬁnancial order, politi-
cians and bureaucrats were acutely concerned about being left out of the
game. Their concern with legitimacy was at base a concern about competi-
tion for resources from powerful ﬁnancial agents. Yes, politicians without
anti-money-laundering programs feared they would appear to be back-
ward, but what motivated them was the fear that they would be excluded
from the global economy.
While The Money Laundry speaks directly to world polity theorists, its
author relies not on an event study of diffusion, which is the norm, but on
an audit of regulatory efﬁcacy, interviews, and analytic narrative. By
broadening the world polity paradigm’s theoretical toolkit with his theory
of power, as well as broadening its methodological palette with experimen-
tal and process-tracing techniques, Sharman helps to open up world polity
theory to new insights and research strategies.
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